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Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
JOHN R. SMINGLER 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF BASIS OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On April 2, 1987, the above-entitled action was tried by the 
Honorable Phillip K. Palmer, Circuit Court Judge, Salt Lake 
County, Sandy Department. The trial court found the pro se 
defendant guilty of improper lookout and no driver's license on 
his person. Defendant was sentenced to pay $75 for improper 
lookout and $25 for no driver's license on the person. 
Additionally, defendant was ordered to pay $100 restitution to 
Janice Bailey for the insurance deductible she paid as a result 
of the collision with defendant which purportedly resulted from 
defendant's improper lookout. 
Thus, jurisdiction is conveyed by §78-2A-3(c), Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended), and Rules 3 and 4, Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OP ISSUES 
1. Does the evidence presented by investigating Officer 
Stadler and Mrs. Bailey's own admission that she was exiting the 
lane of traffic and pulling over to the curb in front of Alta 
High School, warrant setting aside the trial court's finding that 
defendant was guilty of improper lookout. 
2. Whether the trial court's ruling on the payment of 
restitution was based upon admissible evidence, since Mrs. Bailey 
improperly raised the issue of her insurance deductible payment 
after defendant had been sentenced and while Mrs. Bailey was not 
a witness on the stand or subject to cross-examination. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND ORDINANCE IN THE CASE 
Section 249. Duty to keep proper lookout. 41-6-80. No 
person shall drive a vehicle on the streets of this city without 
keeping a reasonable and proper lookout for other traffic, 
objects, fixtures or property thereon or adjacent thereto. 
Section 249, Sandy City Code. 
§76-3-201, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). (See, 
Addendum.) 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
On December 11, 1986, the above-entitled case was filed 
against defendant by Sandy City. Defendant was charged with 
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improper lookout and no driver's license on the person. On 
February 13, 1987, a formal information was filed on the charges. 
On April 2, 1987, the case was tried in a bench trial before 
the Honorable Phillip K. Palmer, Circuit Court Judge, Salt Lake 
County, Sandy Department. Defendant appeared pro se and Sandy 
City was represented by Mark T. Ethington of the Sandy City 
Attorney's Office. The trial court found defendant guilty of 
both offenses charged. Defendant was sentenced to pay $75 for 
improper lookout and $25 for no driver's license on the person. 
Additionally, defendant was ordered to pay $100 restitution to 
Janice Bailey for the insurance deductible she paid as a result 
of the collision with defendant which purportedly resulted from 
defendant's improper lookout. 
On May 4, 1987, defendant filed a Notice of Appeal with the 
trial court. On May 7, 1987, defendant filed an Amended Notice 
of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OP FACTS 
On December 9, 1986, defendant's vehicle and a vehicle 
driven by Janice Bailey collided at approximately 1000 East 11050 
South, Sandy, Utah. (Reporter's Transcript, hereafter "T.," at 
5-7.) Officer Gordon Stadler, Sandy City Police Department, 
arrived at the scene of the accident at approximately 4:10 p.m. 
(T. at 5.) As Officer Stadler approached the scene he noticed 
two damaged vehicles, one behind the other on the right side of 
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the road, just north of the driveway going into the Alta High 
School parking lot (T. at 5-6) . 
Based upon Officer Stadler7s investigation, particularly his 
conversations with defendant and Mrs. Bailey, he determined that 
defendant started to pull out of an Alta High School driveway 
while Mrs. Bailey's vehicle and a truck were northbound on 1000 
East. (T. at 6-7). At the same time that the truck was turning 
into the driveway Mrs. Bailey was pulling over to the side of the 
road to pick up her son and the side of Mrs. Bailey's car hit 
defendant's bumper. (T. at 7.) The point of impact was 
determined by Officer Stadler to be approximately one foot to the 
west of the white line or approximately six feet from the curb. 
(T. at 7.) The accident damaged the front side of the front 
bumper of defendant's vehicle and the whole side of Mrs. Bailey's 
vehicle. (T. at 9.) There were no skid marks, although the 
damage to Mrs. Bailey's vehicle showed she was coming in at an 
angle at the time of the accident. (Tr. at 9, 11-12.) Mrs. 
Bailey conceded that she intended to pull over to the side of the 
road in the vicinity of the accident. (T. at 13.) 
Defendant asserted that the truck involved in the incident 
was southbound, not northerly as Officer Stadler had testified. 
(T. at p. 22.) In addition, defendant testified that he stopped 
after partially rolling out of the driveway. (T. at 24.) 
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The court found that whenever a vehicle emerges from a 
highway it should yield the right of way to all vehicles that may 
present an immediate hazard to any vehicles on the highway or 
pedestrians crossing the driveway. (T. at 24.) The court 
further found that the most credible evidence was that defendant 
was out into the roadway and, since Mrs. Bailey denied that she 
changed her course at all, there was no reasonable doubt that 
defendant was guilty of improper lookout. (T. at 24-25.) The 
court thereafter found defendant guilty of failure to have a 
driver's license on his person. (T. at 25.) 
The court sentenced defendant to pay a fine and surcharge of 
$75 for improper lookout and $25 for the driver's license charge, 
although the finding of guilt on the latter offense would be 
vacated in the event that proof of a valid license on the day of 
the accident was made by defendant within thirty days. (T. at 
26.) The court then excused the defendant. (T. at 26.) 
Sandy City's counsel subsequently asked the court whether 
any restitution should be made. (T. at 26.) Thereafter, Mrs. 
Bailey discussed with the court her $100 deductible under her 
insurance contract for the damage to her vehicle, despite the 
fact that she had been excused as a witness, was not on the 
witness stand, was not under oath and defendant was not given the 
opportunity to cross-examine Mrs. Bailey concerning her 
representations to the court. (T. at 27.) The pro se defendant 
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was not informed of his right to a full hearing on the imposition 
of restitution. (T. at 26-28) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court convicted defendant of improper lookout 
based primarily or in substantial part upon findings that 
defendant was under a duty to yield the right of way to all 
vehicles that presented an imminent danger and that the vehicle 
driven by Mrs, Bailey that struck defendant's vehicle had not 
changed its course at all. These findings are, however, 
inconsistent with the uncontroverted evidence that defendant 
merely had a duty to keep a reasonable and proper lookout and 
that Mrs. Bailey was pulling off the road and hit the front of 
defendant's vehicle within one foot of the white traffic line. 
The trial court erroneously awarded $100 restitution to Mrs. 
Bailey without any admissible evidence to support the restitution 
as mandated by §76-3-201, Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as amended). 
Moreover, Sandy City requested a determination of whether or not 
restitution was appropriate, but failed to introduce any 
testimony of witnesses or other admissible evidence in support of 
the request. Instead, Sandy City permitted Mrs. Bailey to discuss 
the deductible amount under her insurance contract with the 
court, without calling her as a witness, providing defendant an 
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opportunity to present contravening evidence, to cross-examine 
Mrs. Bailey or to object to the imposition of restitution. 
ARGUMENT I 
DEFENDANT WAS FOUND GUILTY OF IMPROPER LOOKOUT 
BASED UPON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
Defendant was convicted of improper lookout pursuant to 
§249, Sandy City Code. This ordinance provides that all drivers 
have a duty to keep a reasonable and proper lookout for other 
traffic. In the present case, Officei: Stadler testified that 
Mrs. Bailey/s vehicle was pulling over to the side of the road 
and had collided with defendant's car at an angle. Mrs. Bailey 
testified that she intended to pull over to the side of the road. 
Thus, the evidence adduced at trial was contrary to the trial 
court's finding that Mrs. Bailey had not changed her course of 
travel in any way. Indeed, the point of impact was within 
approximately one foot of the white line, which further indicates 
that Mrs. Bailey was pulling over to the side of the road. 
The trial court's conclusion that a driver has a duty to 
yield the right of way to all vehicles that present an immediate 
hazard is a stricter, unsubstantiated standard than the lesser 
requirement of §249, Sandy City Code; that the driver keep a 
reasonable and proper lookout for other traffic. 
The well established standard for a Utah appellate court in 
reviewing factual findings of a court sitting without a jury is 
to give deference to the trial court and not overturn its 
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findings if they are adequately supported by the evidence. Wessel 
y. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1985). 
Moreover, when reviewing the findings of a judge a slightly 
broader standard of review may be appropriate than the standard 
for reviewing the findings of juries. Id. at n. 2. Accordingly, 
the standard of review for a bench trial is "one approximating 
the 'clearly erroneous' standard used in federal courts." Id. 
(citations omitted). Additionally, where the issue before the 
appellate court is one of law the "Court is not bound by the 
conclusions of the trial court and may determine the question." 
Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 587 at n. 1 (Utah 1982). 
In the present case, the unrefuted evidence before the trial 
court was that defendant had rolled out and stopped within 
approximately one foot of the white line on 1000 East while Mrs. 
Bailey's vehicle was pulling over to the side of the road. 
Consequently, Mrs. Bailey's vehicle hit the front of defendant's 
vehicle at an angle. Furthermore, the trial court's conclusion 
that a driver yield the right of way to an immediate hazard was 
stricter and inconsistent with §249, Sandy City Code. 
Accordingly, the ruling that defendant was guilty of improper 
lookout is so insufficiently supported by the evidence adduced at 
trial that it is clearly erroneous and the trial court's 
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conclusion of law concerning the improper lookout conviction is 
in contravention of the applicable ordinance. 
ARGUMENT II 
DEFENDANT WAS IMPROPERLY SENTENCED TO 
PAY RESTITUTION BASED UPON INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 
Defendant contends that the $100 award of restitution to 
Janice Bailey was in violation of the pertinent statute. In 
particular, restitution is a permissible sentence for defendants 
found guilty of criminal activity that results in pecuniary 
damages only where the court makes the reasons for restitution a 
part of the record. See, §76-3-201(3)(a)(i)f Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended). The criteria which the trial court must 
consider in determining whether or not to order restitution are 
as follows: 
(i) The financial resources of the defendant and 
the burden that payment of restitution will impose, 
with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay 
restitution on an installment basis or on other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant 
of the payment of restitution and the method of 
payment; and 
{ix) other circumstances which the court 
determines make restitution inappropriate. 
§76-3-201(3)(b), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
In the instant case, Sandy City failed to present any 
admissible evidence in support of its request that the court 
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consider the imposition of restitution. Thus, the court failed to 
expressly consider any of the prescribed criteria. Indeed, the 
entire discussion between Mrs. Bailey and the court concerning 
her $100 deductible under her insurance contract was inadmissible 
evidence, since Mrs. Bailey had been excused as a witness, was 
not on the witness stand, and was not under oath. Furthermore, 
defendant had already been sentenced and excused when Sandy City 
requested restitution and was not given the opportunity to 
present contravening evidence or cross-examine Mrs. Bailey 
concerning the $100 insurance deductible. 
Trial courts have discretion to sentence under §76-3-201, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). See, State v. Shelby, 728 
P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986). However, in State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 
611 (Utah 1985), which involved the trial court's order that 
defendant pay restitution to the victim in conjunction with his 
conviction for arson, the Court sua sponte noted that the 
judgment of the trial court failed to reflect the reasons for the 
order of restitution as required by the relevant statute, 
§76-3-201(3). The Court, however, held as follows: 
In the case before us, there is ample record evidence, 
from which the trial court could have found that 
restitution was proper. Notwithstanding the mandate of 
the statute that the trial court's reasons be included 
as part of its order, we believe that the failure to do 
so in this case was harmless error. Nonetheless, we 
draw attention to this requirement for future guidance 
of the sentencing courts. 
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Id. at 614. The trial court's findings herein do not address any 
of the criteria set forth in §76-3-201(3)(b). 
The more egregious effect of the trial court's imposition of 
restitution was the denial of defendant's right to present 
evidence or cross-examine Mrs. Bailey during her discussion with 
the court after defendant was sentenced. "The right to 
cross-examine is an invaluable right embodied in Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and in the Sixth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution which assures the right to 
confrontation." State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah 
1977). The right of cross-examination is weighed against the 
trial court's obligation to control the trial, but where the 
limitation of cross-examination is prejudicial it constitutes 
reversible error. See, e.g., Xd. at 1388. 
Sandy City's request for restitution after the sentence and 
conviction and the improper discussion between Mrs. Bailey and 
the court precluded defendant from objecting to the imposition, 
amount or distribution of restitution. Section 76-03-201(3)(c), 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), provides that the court 
shall hold a full hearing on restitution if an objection is 
raised. In State v. Stayer, supra, 612, the Court found that 
pursuant to §76-3-201(3)(c) it was "proper to impose restitution 
unless upon a hearing in court the defendant objects to its 
imposition." The Court, however, declined to consider the issue 
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since the record did not reveal whether the defendant had 
objected. 
In the present case, the pro se defendant did not have the 
opportunity to object to the sentence of restitution because 
Sandy City requested the relief after excusal of the witnesses 
and defendant, after sentencing, and during the close of trial 
when defendant would ordinarily not have the right to object to 
his sentence. Moreover, defendant was not informed of his right 
to a full hearing on the imposition of restitution. Finally, the 
restitution ordered by the court was based upon evidence that was 
heard without providing defendant a right to present contravening 
evidence or cross-examine Mrs. Bailey and based upon evidence 
which was clearly not admissible, all of which prejudiced 
defendant and constitute reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence at trial was manifestly insufficient to enable 
the court to convict defendant of improper lookout. Overwhelming 
evidence showed that Mrs. Bailey collided with the front of 
defendant's stationary vehicle while pulling over to the side of 
the road. Hence, the mere fact that the point of impact was 
approximately one foot past the white line does not constitute 
failure to keep a reasonable and proper lookout for traffic. 
Sandy City failed to call witnesses or introduce other 
admissible evidence to establish any basis for imposition of 
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restitution. Sandy City's attempt to seek restitution on the 
basis of a discussion between the court and Mrs. Bailey after 
defendant had been sentenced was plain error. 
Therefore, defendant respectfully requests reversal of the 
conviction for improper lookout and further requests that the 
order of restitution be vacated and that the case be removed for 
a new trial to the extent required under Rule 30(b), Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
DATED this > /afy.day of June, 1987. 
illiam G.lFowlei 
) fQlr-^&J 
W t r
J. Angus Edwards 
FOWLER & PURSER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^ \ 'Aday of June, 1987, I served 
four copies of foregoing Brief of Appellant upon the following, 
by depositing copies thereof in the United States mails, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Sandy City Attorney's 
Office 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
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S/SMIb 
ADDENDUM 
§76-3-201, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as Amended) 
PUNISHMENTS 76-3-201 
substituted "in the habitation" for "therein" in 
Subsection (l)(a); inserted "he reasonably be-
lieves" in Subsection (l)(a); substituted "in the 
habitation" for "therein" in Subsection (l)<b); 
added Subsection (2); and made minor changes 
in phraseology. 
Habitation. 
The habitation which a person defends may 
include that person's residence or the home of 
another where that person is a guest. State v. 
McKenna, 782 P.2d 984 (Utah 1986). 
Defendant's appearances at his estranged 
wife's apartment to visit his children gave him 
no proprietary right or justification to consider 
or treat the apartment as his own "habitation," 
and his aggravated assault on his wife's over-
night male companion was therefore not justi-
fied by this section. State v. McKenna, 782 
P 2d 984 (Utah 1986). 
CHAPTER 3 
PUNISHMENTS 
Part 
2. Sentencing. 
3. Fines and special sanctions. 
Part 
4. Limitations and special provisions on sen-
tences. 
PART 2 
SENTENCING 
Section 
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sen-
tences allowed — Civil penal-
ties — Restitution — Defini-
tions — Resentencing — Aggra-
vation or mitigation of crimes 
with mandatory sentences. 
76-3-201.1. Nonpayment of fine or restitution 
as contempt — Imprisonment 
— Relief where default not con-
tempt — Collection of default. 
76-3-201.2. Civil action by victim for dam-
ages. 
Section 
76-3-202. 
76-3-203. 
76-3-207. 
Paroled persons — Termination or 
discharge from sentence — 
Time served on parole — Dis-
cretion of board of pardons. 
Felony conviction — Indetermi-
nate term of imprisonment — 
Increase of sentence if firearm 
used. 
Capital felony — Sentencing pro-
ceeding. 
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Definitions — 
Resentencing — Aggravation or mitigation of 
crimes with mandatory sentences. 
(1) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; or 
(e) to death. 
(2) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to 
forfeit property, dissolve a corporation, suspend or cancel a license, or permit 
removal of a person from office, cite for contempt, or impose any other civil 
penalty. A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
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76-3-201 CRIMINAL CODE 
(3)(a)(i) When a person is adjudged guilty of criminal activity which has 
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it 
may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitu-
tion up to double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or 
victims of the offense of which the defendant has pleaded guilty, is 
convicted, or to the victim of any other criminal conduct admitted by 
the defendant to the sentencing court unless the court in applying the 
criteria in Subsection (3)(b) finds that restitution is inappropriate. 
Whether the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of 
the court record. 
(ii) When a defendant has been extradited to this state under 
Chapter 30, Title 77, or has been transported at governmental ex-
pense from one county to another within the state for the purpose of 
resolving pending criminal charges, and is adjudged guilty of crimi-
nal activity in the county to which he has been returned, the court 
may, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the 
defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental 
entity for the extradition or transportation. In determining whether 
restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in 
Subsection (3)(b). If the court determines that restitution is appropri-
ate or inappropriate, the court shall make the reasons for the decision 
a part of the court record. The court shall send a copy of its order of 
restitution to the Division of Finance. 
(b) In determining whether or not to order restitution, or restitution 
which is complete, partial, or nominal, the court shall take into account: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(c) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow him a full 
hearing on the issue. 
(4) As used in Subsection (3): 
(a) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(b) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's crimi-
nal activities and includes, but is not limited to, the money equivalent of 
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses such 
as earnings and medical expenses. 
(c) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including insured damages. 
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PUNISHMENTS 76-3-201 
(d) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered 
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. "Vic-
tim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activi-
ties. 
(5)(a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances 
in aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, or pre-
senting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposi-
tion of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under § 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation sub-
mitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall be guided by sentenc-
ing rules regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the Judi-
cial Council. 
(6)(a) If a defendant subject to Subsection (5) has been sentenced and com-
mitted to the Utah State Prison, the court may, within 120 days of the 
date of commitment on its own motion, or at any time upon the recom-
mendation of the Board of Pardons, recall the sentence and commitment 
previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if 
he had not previously been sentenced, so long as the new sentence is no 
greater than the initial sentence nor less than the mandatory time pre-
scribed by statute. The resentencing provided for in this section shall 
comply with the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council to eliminate 
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing. Credit 
shall be given for time served. 
(b) The court shall state the reasons for its sentence choice on the 
record at the time of sentencing. The court shall also inform the defen-
dant as part of the sentence that if the defendant is released from prison, 
he may be on parole for a period of ten years. 
(c) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, 
rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse 
of a child, the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and 
if the charge is set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by 
the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant 
shall be sentenced to the aggravated mandatory term in state prison. This 
subsection supersedes any conflicting provision of law. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L. Compiler's Notes. — The 1979 amendment 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; L. 1979, ch. 69, § 1; added subsecs. (3) and (4) relating to restitu-
1981, ch. 59, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, § 1; 1983, ch. tion to victim. 
88, S 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, 3 1; The 1981 amendment substituted "court 
1987, ch. 107, 9 1. shall order1' in the first sentence of subsec. 
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